mental structures that may be infl uenced in unique ways by the two conditions.
The importance of capacity assessment in older adults cannot be denied ( Moye & Marson, 2007 ) . In the human society, cooperation-enhancing social sentiments, like altruism, fairness, or reciprocity, are central to many aspects of decision making. In the paper, we explore experimentally whether AD patients in the fi rst stage of their disease experience " social memory " loss, which is the loss of capabilities that help regulate social interactions, such as the ability to show fairness and altruism, and the capacity to value one's social standing, that is, one's reputation. These fi ndings could help link degeneration in specifi c brain structures in AD patients with structures that are engaged in cooperative social interactions, that is, the neural correlates of such cooperation-enhancing social norms as a sense of fairness, altruism, and reciprocity. In this way, our observations could add to our understanding of the neural basis of one distinguishing feature of the human species, namely cooperative collective action.
To test the degree of " social memory " loss, we invited Stage I AD, MCI, and HEC individuals to participate in a dictator game (DG, see Camerer, 2003 , for references for this type of game). In this social game, one player, called the dictator, receives a specifi ed amount of money from the experimenter and has to decide how much of this money goes to another player (typically an unknown person). The other player, called the receiver, can only accept the money. This game involves the simplest form of decision making in two-person bargaining because no strategic consideration of the receiver's reaction to the offer should infl uence the dictator's decision. It is simple to understand and play, which makes it well suited to test subjects with cognitive impairments. It is also well documented. Thus, this game can provide useful tools for evaluating " self-interest " or " other-regarding " behavior in AD patients. Self-interest is key to explaining individual decision making in economics. From this perspective, the dictator in a DG should give nothing to the other person. However, other-regarding behavior, which may itself evolve from maximizing behavior, must be invoked to explain human cooperation and the evolution of social norms that enhance cooperation. Otherregarding behavior may take different forms in different models, be it fairness ( Fehr & Schmidt, 1999 ) , altruism ( Andreoni, 1989 ) , indirect reciprocity ( Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004 ) , or reputation building ( Fehr, 2004 ) , to name a few. The DG, being devoid of any strategic element with respect to the other player, the receiver, who in fact plays no active role in the game, illustrates that the decision to give a nonzero amount is other regarding or driven by cooperation-enhancing social norms and preferences (see Camerer, 2003 , for references on social norms and preferences). Consequently, by comparing the amount given by Stage I AD patients with that given by MCI patients and HECs, we can approach the degree to which patients with Stage I AD continue to apply these social norms and social preferences.
M ethods
The subjects in our DG experiment were randomly selected from the patient pool of the Hospital San Vicente in Alicante, Spain, and recruited by telephone by the staff of the Alzheimer's Center at the Hospital. They were asked to participate in a session in which they would perform " some mental exercises. " They were also informed of the estimated duration of the exercises and told that no physical examination or medical procedure would be carried out. There was no indication of any reward.
As mentioned earlier, subjects were classifi ed in one of three groups depending on whether they had been diagnosed with AD or MCI or had no diagnosed cognitive impairment. The diagnoses had previously been made by a highly experienced team (neurologist -neuropsychologist) following the National Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke (NINCDS) and Alzheimer's Disease and Related Disorders Association (ADRDA; McKhann et al., 1984 ) criteria. The candidates had to complete the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE, Folstein ) and the Alzheimer's Disease Assessment Scale (ADAS, Rosen, Mohs & Davis, 1986) . Criteria for allocating the MCI pool followed the guidelines by Petersen et al. (1999) restricting the sample to amnestic MCI single-domain type ( Artero et al., 2006 ) . Inclusion in the MCI group required MMSE score equal or greater than 24 and ADAS score equal or smaller than 10, and not meeting Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision ( DSM-IV-TR ) dementia criteria. Inclusion in the AD group was based on the DSM-IV-TR and NINCDS -ADRDA criteria. The criteria established by NINCDS -ADRDA for labeling a patient as AD consist in fi nding at least one more impaired function (in addition to memory) among the socalled cognitive functions (aphasia, apraxia, agnosia, and executive functions). When only one of these functions is affected, the patient is classifi ed as mild or Stage I.
Patients with other neurological, metabolic, and psychiatric pathologies were excluded. All the patients recruited as AD and MCI received a complete neurological and neuropsychological evaluation at the time of the study.
In detail, the three groups of subjects were AD group: hospital outpatients who had been diagnosed • in the previous 6 months and who were in the initial stage (Stage I: very mild and mild stage) of the disease ( Hughes et al., 1982 ; Reisberg et al., 1982 ) ; MCI group: outpatients who had also been diagnosed in • the previous six months; and HEC group: invited subjects without mental impairments.
•
The subjects in this group had a similar age and social background as members of the other two groups. This group comprised two types of subject: fi rst, members of the patients ' family and, second, volunteers from a State center for old people.
Subjects were overwhelmingly working class and had completed only a few years of schooling. Table 1 summarizes the sample. More details are provided in Appendix 2 .
Groups of two to eight participants were taken to the experimental room, which was located in the hospital grounds. In each treatment, they were seated behind cardboard screens to protect their privacy, provided with an envelope, and given a present of ten € 1 coins. In the double-blind version of the DG run in the United States, in which participants are anonymous to other participants as well as to the experimenter, dollar bills are used ( Eckel & Grossman, 1996 ; Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996 ) . Unfortunately, there are no paper € 1 bills, which would have been much easier to conceal in an envelope. Frey and Bohn et (1995) also used coins in their experiments.
Instructions (see Appendix A) were read aloud. These described the receiver and asked participants to place any coins they wanted to allocate to the receiver inside the envelope, while keeping their share in their pocket or purse. At the end of each treatment, an experimenter collected the envelopes. Importantly, the word dictator was never mentioned.
Subjects were told that their names would not be revealed. However, in order to avoid a degree of complexity that might not have been easily handled by AD subjects, we decided against using a full-anonymity procedure, such as the double-anonymous procedure by Hoffman and colleagues (1996) , or any other complex procedure.
We implemented three sequential treatments:
The anonymous treatment: The receiver was described as • an anonymous person " like yourselves " who was located in another room in the building; The two-way identifi cation treatment: To each dictator • corresponded a receiver, who was of the same sex and of a similar age, who entered the room where the experiment was taking place and was personally introduced to the dictator as the person who would receive whatever money he/she allocated to the receiver. The intention of visual recognition was to turn the faceless receiver into fullfl edged human being; The Red Cross treatment: The receiver was identifi ed as • the Red Cross (see Eckel & Grossman, 1996 , for a description of a DG with a Red Cross receiver).
Each subject participated in all three treatments. The anonymous treatment took place fi rst. Once it was over, instructions for the two-way identifi cation treatment were read out, the receivers were asked to enter the room and were introduced to the dictators without names being mentioned. Thereafter, the receivers were escorted out of the room and the dictators made their decisions. Finally, instructions for the Red Cross treatment were read out and, after the envelopes for this last treatment were collected, the participants were dismissed. We did not test for order effects because our interest was in comparing differences among groups.
R esults
As shown in the three graphs in Figure 1 , our data indicate Observation 2: Visual contact with the receiver in the two-way identifi cation treatment did not change the pattern of giving observed in the anonymous treatment in any of the three groups.
To our subjects, it appeared that a stranger was a stranger whether or not he or she was seen (e.g., Wilcoxon test, p = .9). This may indicate that, like healthy participants, Stage I AD patients can form abstract images of other individuals and can relate to them as they do with visually observed individuals. Observation 3: A signifi cant increase in giving occurred in all three groups when the receiver was the Red Cross. The amount given to the Red Cross was found to be signifi cantly greater (at p < .0001 level, using the Wilcoxon test for both pairwise comparison of anonymous and twoway identifi cation, respectively, with Red Cross). In particular, when the results of the two-way identifi cation treatment are compared with those of the Red Cross treatment, it can be seen that 48% of subjects in the AD group, 58% in the MCI, and 44% in the HEC increased the amount they gave. The more generous allocations to the Red Cross seem to indicate that all three groups were equally aware of the social context. In particular, the change in AD subjects ' behavior that occurred when moving from the fi rst two treatments to the Red Cross treatment was indistinguishable from the change that occurred in both MCI patients and HEC.
In summary, the decisions made by AD patients were indistinguishable from those made by MCI patients and healthy elderly participants. Note: AD = Alzheimer disease ; MCI = mild cognitive impairment; HEC = healthy elderly controls.
D iscussion
It is well known that DG results are quite sensitive to design details. In our study, see Tables 2 and 3 , subjects gave on average more than in most previously reported DG experiments (e.g., Bohnet & Frey, 1999 ; Eckel & Grossman, 1996 ; Frey & Bohnet, 1995 ) .
Subjects in most DG experiments are undergraduate students, with ages around 20, but in our experiment, the average age is above 70 years. Although it has been observed that " older adults " decision behavior is similar to that of young adults, Bellemare and Kroeger (2003) , Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) , Fehr, Fischbacher, von Rosenbladt, Schupp, and Wagner (2003) , Kovalchik, Camerer, Grether, Plott, and Allman (2004) , and Sutter and Kocher (2004) found that the degree of reciprocity, as indicated by the returns in trust games, becomes signifi cantly higher as age increases. Age, therefore, could explain the more generous amounts of giving in our experiment compared with the previous ones with students.
In addition, in most DG experiments, subjects are recruited inside campuses with the promise of earning money when volunteering in an experiment. But, as Eckel and Grossman (2000) reported, subjects who are, instead, " corralled " for participation can behave very differently. They compared the results obtained in DG experiments using student volunteers with those with pseudovolunteers. Pseudovolunteers were recruited in class to participate in an experiment during class time. In the latter group, 28.7% gave everything to charity and contributions were 22% -50% higher than in the volunteers group, where only 5.2% gave everything. It appears that subjects in the pseudovolunteers group were motivated by " something other than the incentive structure built into the experimental design, " which is another way of saying that self-interest did not drive their decisions. Because the participants in our experiment were more like pseudovolunteers than genuine volunteers, the observations by Eckel and Grossman could explain some of the differences.
Finally, one should not disregard the effect of the participant's surprise that a procedure carried out in a hospital should result in money being earned. In fact, a number of subjects in all three groups stated that they had no entitlement to the experimental money, that they had not earned it, and, therefore, that they did not deserve to take it with them. They felt they could not possibly justify accepting money as " manna from the experimental heaven " to their husband or wife.
It should also be noted that, in our study, there was no difference between the results of the anonymous treatment and those of the two-way identifi cation treatment. This contrasts with the results of Frey & Bohnet (1995) who found that the amount given increased signifi cantly from one treatment to the other (see Table 3 , equal divisions increased from 25% to 71%). However, Frey and Bohnet used a between-group experimental design, whereas we used a within-group design, thereby promoting, perhaps, a higher correlation in giving behavior among treatments. But, most important, our subjects, as discussed earlier, already gave half or more in the anonymous treatment, which was very generous and could hardly be improved.
In any case, the important point is that, whatever factors drove the participants ' generosity, they did not infl uence the three subject groups differently . Recall that because the three groups were recruited in an identical way for the same experiments in the same hospital environment and had similar social backgrounds and ages, they only signifi cantly differed in their cognitive abilities, according to the clinical tests. But the differential impairments in their cognitive skills had no effect on the amounts that they decided to share.
Although descriptions comparing AD with normal elderly subjects indicate basic problem-solving disorders (see, e.g., Lai & Karlawish, 2007 ; Martini & Domahs, 2003 ; Torralva, Dorrego, Sabe, Chemerinski, & Starkstein, 2000 ) , it is well known that AD patients are, nonetheless, capable of solving well-structured problems ( Passini, Rainville, Marchand, & Joanette,1995 ) . Kim, Karlawish, and Caine (2002) reviewed the relevant literature identifying 32 studies, which reached very heterogeneous conclusions. They concluded that research into the decision-making competence of cognitively impaired elderly persons is a growing fi eld that is just beginning to yield fi ndings with practical implications for preserving the autonomy and welfare of this group of vulnerable elderly patients.
It is well established that AD patients suffer from a semantic memory impairment ( Daum, Riesch, Sartori, & Birbaumer, 1996 ; Giffard et al., 2002 ; Tippett, Gendall, Farah, & Thompson-Schill, 2004 ) , reduced executive control function ( Voss & Bullock, 2004 ) , as well as loss of task and loss of detachment ( Marson, Amis, McInturff, Bartolucci, & Harrell, 1999 ) . Even in the early stages, AD patients have problems in updating the contents of their working memory and suppressing activation of no-longerrelevant information ( Sebastian, Menor, & Elosua, 2006 ) and have diffi culties in handling decisions under risk or ambiguity ( Delazer, Sinz, Zamarian, & Benke, 2007 ; Sinz, Zamarian, Benke, Wenning, & Delazer, 2008 ) .
But cognitive process amounts to much more than these functions, and other domains appear to remain conserved. Although there is a differential impairment of recall memory, the personality, values, and substantial long-term memory remain preserved, as does implicit memory for recent events ( Sabat, 2005 ) . Similarly, AD conserves the capacity for acquiring and maintaining implicit affective dispositions even when explicit memory is impaired ( Blessing, Keil, Linden, Heim, & Ray, 2006 ) and, at least in mild AD, one component of metamemorial ability ( Waring, Chong, Wolk, & Budson 2008 ) . These features probably underlie the observation of the retained ability to vote in patients with very mild to mild AD ( Appelbaum, Bonnie, & Karlawish, 2005 ; Irastorza, Corujo, & Banuelos, 2007 ) .
That some cognitive components are preserved was described early ( Nebes and Brady, 1990 ) , and our results suggest that in early stages of the disease, the functioning of the neural circuitry responsible for the prosocial capabilities tested in the experiment appears to remain suffi ciently well preserved and that the operational subset of this circuitry seems still capable of maintaining a large degree of normal social behavior. This is consistent with the observation that a broad range of complex cognitive abilities is preserved in patients with dementia of the Alzheimer type who cannot perform simple actions (see Beatty et al., 1994 ; Goldberg, 2005 ; Gregory et al., 2002 ) , and in agreement with our present understanding of AD, which generally accepts that lesions begin to appear in the temporal region, mainly in the hippocampus ( Nordberg, 2001 ) . In contrast, the structures involved in decision making are mainly located in the prefrontal cortex, which is affected in more advanced stages of the disease but which remains apparently unaffected early on. Changes in the performance of decision-making tasks would be expected in subjects with frontal pathologies (e.g., frontotemporal dementia or orbitofrontal lesions). In fact, some studies have shown that patients with orbitofrontal cortical lesions are unable to anticipate the negative consequences of their choices ( Camille et al., 2004 ; Reisberg et al., 1982 ) . Stage I AD patients do not usually show the loss of basic emotions and insight, the selfi shness, or the loss of interest that characterize other dementias, like Bohnet and Frey (1999) , Eckel and Grossman (1996) , and Frey and Bohnet (1995) and in the Three Treatments (anonymous, two-way, and Red Cross) in This Paper
Amount offered
Anonymous receiver ( Bohnet & Frey, 1999 ; Frey & Bohnet, 1995 ) Two-way identifi cation ( Bohnet & Frey, 1999 ; Frey & Bohnet, 1995 ) Red Cross ( Eckel & Grossman, 1996 ) (Double-blind)
Anonymous receiver (this study) Boller et al., 2002 ; Bucks & Radford, 2004 ) . Clearly, a study of how patients with frontotemporal dementia perform in the DG would provide results that would complement our fi ndings. However, our results appear to indicate that decision making in the DG is performed without the involvement of short-term memory, clearly impaired in our AD patients.
C onclusions
This study did not demonstrate a statistically signifi cant difference in the way Stage I AD patients, MCI patients, and HEC perform in the DG, a game that involves the simplest form of decision making in two-person bargaining. Moreover, like the MCI patients and the healthy elderly participants, AD subjects gave more generously as the receiver changed from being an anonymous or visually observed individual to a well-known charity.
This experiment enables us to conclude that the memory defi cit characteristic of Stage I AD patients appears not to affect their performances when deciding how generous they should be to a third party. Paraphrasing Hoffman and colleagues (1996 , p. 655), we can say that, if it is past experiences that drive participants ' decisions, then Stage I AD patients have not lost their memories of these experiences. If, on the other hand, it is the prospect of the future consequences of their decisions that shape them, then Stage I AD patients have not lost their concern for how their decisions will be judged. Like healthy subjects, AD patients bring their experiences and their reputation from the outside world into the experimental environment. This is consistent with healthy elderly patients.
To conclude, Stage I AD patients appear to be as capable of making decisions involving the prosocial norms and prosocial preferences that regulate altruism, fairness, or reputation as any person of their age. Whatever brain structures are affected by the disease, it appears not to impinge seriously on the neural basis for cooperation-enhancing social sentiments at the early stages.
Although submitting AD patients to a decision-making task in social games is not easy, due to their cognitive impairments, our research suggests two fruitful lines of research. First, involving patients with more advanced AD in a DG game, in order to establish the degree of fading of social memories as the disease progresses. Second, relying on different social games, to further study the strategic behavior of Stage I AD patients in social interactions: In particular, using public good games ( Kagel & Roth, 1995 ) to check for selfi sh or cooperative behavior and trust games ( Camerer, 2003 ) to check for trust or trustworthiness. As these games can be designed to involve AD patients in repeated social interactions, they should allow for a more subtle understanding of how AD patients react when confronted with a variety of contributions from other players.
It is worth acknowledging the limitations that a poor understanding of the early dementia manifestations imposes on our study. Subtle defi cits that may elude detection could be signifi cant for the differential diagnoses with MCI ( Nelson & O'Connor, 2008 ) , although the similar behavior of MCI and AD observed in our experiment suggests that better diagnostic tools will not affect our results. In fact, properly designed social games could be added to the new battery of tests proposed by Dubois and colleagues (2007) (incorporating the use of biomarkers through structural magnetic resonance imaging , molecular neuroimaging with positron emission tomography, and cerebrospinal fl uid analyses) and, thereby, homing in on the social defi cits associated with the neurological decline. 
Instructions 1
Good morning. Thank you for participating in the exercise. In this exercise, each person will be paired with another located in another room. You don't know this person and he or she doesn't know who you are either. In addition, you will not meet each other. We will now give each of you 10 euros and an envelope. You have to decide how much out of these 10 euros you would like to give to the person you don't know and how much you want to keep for yourself. Put the euros you want to give to the other person (if any) inside the envelope. Keep the remaining euros for yourself anywhere you want. What you do is secret. Nobody will know your decision. For this reason, you are seated behind cardboard screens. There is no hurry. You have fi ve minutes to decide. Are there any questions? PAUSE This part will be carried out separately after the previous experiment has fi nished. The persons who enter the room will be dressed conventionally, will be of the same sex as the patient, and will be not too dissimilar in age.
Instructions 2
In the following exercise, each of you will be paired with a person who will enter the room for a moment so that you can see him or her. (These persons enter and position themselves close to their paired subject's chair. The experimenter says " this is the person with whom you are matched " and invites the subjects to look at each other. After a few seconds, the experimenter says " thank you " and " you can go now " and the persons depart). We will now give you ten euros and an envelope. You have to decide how much out of these 10 euros you would like to give to the person you just saw and how much you want to keep for yourself. Note : Three subject groups: patients with AD, MCI, and HEC. MCI = mild cognitive impairment; F = female; M = male; SE = self-employed; E = employed; AD = Alzheimer ' s disease; HEC = healthy elderly controls.
(Appendix B: Raw patient data)
